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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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12 August 1966

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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12 August **1966**

*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

South Vietnam Military Developments: Fighting continued yesterday between allied forces and elements of an estimated 10-battalion enemy concentration during Operation COLORADO/LIEN KIET 52. (See Map)

Allied losses in the 11 August contact reportedly were 6 US killed and 47 US wounded. No enemy losses were reported.

South Vietnam Political Developments: Problems with some Caltex oil workers and with a dissident tribal autonomy organization loom as potentially serious.

The Minister of Labor and the president of the largest labor organization both feel that a Caltex strike, which would be the second in a month, is imminent and might spread to other oil concerns. Caltex managers, attempting to maintain office discipline, recently fired both a union and a "management" employee in hopes of demonstrating impartiality. However, union bargainers have not been placated and have apparently threatened to call a strike to get the point across that the union employee should be reinstated.

Meanwhile, in the Darlac Province capital, the traditional seat of montagnard politics, a threat to boycott the September elections has been raised by the dissident tribal autonomy organization, FULRO. The FULRO leader, probably operating from exile in Cambodia, has given the government until 15 August to agree to certain FULRO demands, in return for which he would call off FULRO's noncooperative stance. (See Map)

(continued)

PROBABLE COASTAL DEFENSE GUN SITES



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12 Aug 66 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

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Although FULRO retains a potential for fomenting trouble in the highlands, a call for a boycott probably would have only limited response among montagnard tribes as a whole.

Military Developments in North Vietnam: North Vietnam may be developing a heavy artillery defense system at key points along its coastline, according to information derived from photography and captured DRV naval personnel.

Most of the batteries so far detected are grouped about significant port areas and apparently are equipped with guns which range in caliber from 85-mm. to 152-mm. Defense weapons of this sort could be useful to the DRV against hostile naval operations within 20 miles of its coast. There is no evidence, thus far, that the coastal defense system includes missiles.

Operational use of at least one of these coastal defense sites was reported on 4 April 1966 when US destroyers received several salvos from batteries located near Vinh. The ships were operating 17 miles offshore to provide search-and-rescue support for aircraft conducting strikes in the area. Other probable coastal defense sites in the southern half of North Vietnam are believed to be at Quang Khe, Dong Khe, Hon Me Island, Ba Long and Sam Son. (See Map)

In the north, heavy artillery positions have been photographed at Do Son which protect the seaward approaches to Haiphong harbor. Three coastal defense sites have been photographed on Cat Ba Island, the chief operating base for North Vietnam's PT boats. Photography and prisoner reporting suggests that other gun sites may be present at the port of Hon Gai and on

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Danh Do La Island. (See Map)

Communist China: Recent unusual developments convey an impression of disarray and tension in the leadership.

Ignoring passages in the 8 August Central Committee decision that provided for curbs on the purification drive, the usually authoritative Red Flag on 10 August talked in terms of a new upsurge in the drive. The magazine emphasized that the "first," most imperative aim of this phase of the drive was to bring down unnamed powerful figures within the party who have taken the "path of capitalism." The 8 August directive had merely listed this as one of several aims.

Red Flag asserted that in many areas the drive has "gone astray or is going on sluggishly," and sharply criticized party officials conducting the drive. It declared that these officials should stop interfering with the "cultural revolution" at the grass roots and advised local units that they should rely on the "masses" and "resolutely resist erroneous leadership." On each of these points Red Flag was far sharper than the Central Committee directive. According to that directive, the drive was advancing in a "correct" direction and should continue, but under tighter party control and with clearer guidelines.

The Red Flag version may well represent the attitude of Mao Tse-tung, who on the day Red Flag appeared, reportedly exhorted an audience in Peking to carry on the "cultural revolution" to the end. The differing emphases in the two documents could reflect a division of views among the top leadership, perhaps between Mao and some of his immediate advisers.

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This sense of confusion is also conveyed by for	eigr
press reports from Peking claiming that the 11 Aug	gust
edition of People's Daily, which carried a picture s	story
of Mao's 10 August appearance, was withdrawn from	m
circulation and reissued hours later without the Ma	
item.	

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Congo (Kinshasa): [President Mobutu is thinking of resigning.]

Mobutu told a US official on 9 August that he had given himself 48 hours to decide. The deadline has passed without any sign that he has made up his mind. Despite his gloomy mood, there is reason to believe that his naturally mercurial temperament will assert itself and that he will stay on.

Nevertheless, in recent conversations Mobutu has appeared tired and depressed. He apparently is discouraged mainly by the problems he has encountered in implementing his new, more nationalistic policy toward Belgium, but the pressures of the continuing mutiny in Kisangani have probably also had an effect.

Mobutu's long-standing suspicions of Belgian machinations seem to have been broadened to include fears that diplomats of other Western nations are plotting against him. He also suspects Premier Mulamba of undercutting him.

Should Mobutu resign, an era of debilitating strife among Congolese factions, both civilian and military, probably would break out. If he does remain in office, the growing problems he faces can be expected to produce more manifestations of his frustration and sus-

picion.

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<u>Disarmament</u>: [Further strains on Western unity are developing on the issue of nonproliferation.]

These strains are becoming apparent as the conference of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee approaches an end with little prospect of any movement toward a nonproliferation treaty. According to the US delegation in Geneva, the allies believe that the US draft for a treaty is no longer useful for serious negotiations and is not an attractive platform for continuing the Western stand.

The British proposal to eliminate the so-called European option—which would allow for the development of a European nuclear force—seems to be gaining support because of the belief that the West must make some move to get negotiations started again. Among the NATO allies, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada support the British proposal.

Restlessness may lead one or more of the allies to take an initiative to bring changes in the Western position. Italy, which has proposed unilateral declarations by states not having nuclear weapons that they will not acquire them, has complained that the US should not prevent its allies from taking initiatives if the US is itself not willing to move forward.

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*Dominican Republic: In a speech broadcast last night, President Balaguer said there is no basis for the current spate of rumors that a serious breach has occurred between himself and the country's military leaders.

press stories during the past several days have caused widespread speculation in Santo Domingo that Balaguer was about to confront the military with major command changes, including the replacement of Defense Minister Perez y Perez with the president's controversial military aide Colonel Nivar Seijas.

Balaguer announced his full confidence in the present military chiefs and blamed reported differences on ''propaganda excesses and some news cor-

ences on "propaganda excesses and some news correspondents."

In the opinion of the US defense attaches, however, the rumors will persist as long as Colonel Nivar, who is suspected by the military hierarchy of attempting to undermine their authority, remains as military adviser to the president.

Balaguer also used the speech to denounce recent isolated disturbances for which he blamed irresponsible agitators playing on "our politically primitive psychology." He singled out the Communist-led 14th of June Revolutionary Movement as one of the groups guilty of attempting to revive the turmoil of last year. To curb such abuses, the President said he was sending to Congress a bill which would limit all political activity to internal party activities and constructive political criticism until three months before the next scheduled election.

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Opposition groups are not expected to take these restrictions without bitterly criticizing Balaguer, but the Reformist Party's dominant position in congress assures passage of the proposed law.

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* Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense.

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NOTE

Iran: The Shah told a high US official on 10 August that it is now doubtful that Iran will purchase Soviet surface-to-air missiles but it might still buy trucks, antiaircraft guns, and other smaller items from the Eastern bloc. The Shah termed the Soviet response to his request for arms "less than enthusiastic" and is annoyed by Moscow's procrastination. Strong US arguments against a Soviet-Iranian arms deal, along with concessions on terms for US military equipment for Iran, probably have also caused the Shah to reconsider his arms requirements.

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistants to the President

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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